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A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS:
GAPS, RELEVANCE AND INTEGRATED
EVIDENCE
Carl F. Cranor, Ph.D., M.S.L.*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Daubert v.
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals and related cases,1 overturned the
Frye rule for assessing expert testimony2 and heightened judges’
duties to review expert testimony, including scientific testimony
in toxic tort cases. This job may have turned out to be more

*

Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside.
M.S.L., 1981 Yale Law School; Ph.D. 1971, University of California, Los
Angeles; B.A. 1966, Mathematics, University of Colorado. I want to thank
Margaret Berger for the opportunity to discuss these issues at the Science for
Judges Program at Brooklyn Law School March 3-4, 2006.
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993);
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2
Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test required
that the generic kinds of studies, tests or techniques on which an expert might
rest testimony must be “generally accepted in the pertinent field.” Id. at 104.
Specifically it noted that, “Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Id. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.” Id.

7
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difficult than the justices envisioned because one hurdle facing
experts is the nature of scientific (or nondeductive) arguments
themselves. The structure of nondeductive inferences, despite
common use of them in our daily lives and their pervasive use in
science and other technical areas, may not be fully appreciated
because of the complex relationship between premises and
conclusion and the substantive expertise needed to assess the
arguments.
Section I of this article discusses the amount of data known
about some chemicals currently in commerce and how this
profoundly affects information that experts have at their
disposal, likely increasing the complexity of the arguments they
can offer in support of legal claims. Section II of this article
describes nondeductive (and scientific) inferences. Section III
then focuses on three specific problems that pose particular
challenges for courts: gaps in the arguments, scientific relevance
of information, and the need to assess arguments based on all
the integrated relevant evidence.3 Scientific testimony must
utilize scientific arguments. These are nondeductive inferences,
widely utilized, but perhaps under-appreciated. Nondeductive
arguments, even the best of them, will have gaps that courts will
need to recognize but not overreact to. A reviewing body needs
to permit an expert’s testimony to rely on all the scientifically
relevant information he or she utilizes in his or her arguments.
The arguments must then be assessed by considering all the
scientifically relevant evidence taken together on which the
argument is based (not rejecting each piece of evidence);
otherwise the review would not be a scientifically fair
evaluation. Proper understanding of scientific arguments
suggests that some courts have not fairly reviewed them as
Daubert mandates. Lastly, Section IV will sketch how scientists
would assess such arguments and then suggest a procedure
courts might follow to mimic this for legal admissibility.

3

This Article does not seek to undertake a comprehensive discussion of
the numerous issues concerning such arguments.
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I. IGNORANCE ABOUT THE CHEMICAL UNIVERSE
Chemical substances are quite often the objects of toxic tort
suits, but regrettably little is known about them. This is a
substantial barrier for those who might have been harmed by
exposure to a toxic chemical. Moreover, it also greatly burdens
experts who testify about such exposures because they are often
forced to assemble disparate kinds of evidence that is both
scientifically relevant and sufficiently good to come to
conclusions about the toxicity of products. This may pose
reviewing difficulties for judges and others who are not
intellectually close to scientific arguments because such
arguments are complex.
In 1984 there were between 65,000 and 100,000 chemicals
registered for use in commerce. At that time little was
understood about their toxicity properties. The National
Academy of Sciences found that for 78 percent of the 3,000 topvolume chemicals in commerce, the most basic toxicity results
could not be found in the public record.4 The Academy’s
findings with regard to particular groups of registered chemicals
were equally disturbing. The Academy found:
 12,860 substances produced in excess of one million
lbs/year, but 78 percent had no toxicity data at all;
 13,911 chemicals produced in less than one million
lbs/year (76 percent had no toxicity data);
 21,752 substances whose production volume was
unknown (82 percent had no toxicity data);
 8,627 food additives (46 percent had no toxicity
data);*
 1,815 drugs (25 percent no toxicity data);*
 3,410 cosmetic (56 percent had no toxicity data); and
 3,350 pesticides (36 percent had no toxicity data).5
4

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING 84 (1984).
See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SCREENING AND TESTING CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE 1 (1995). If derivatives
and metabolites are included, some experts suggest that the more appropriate
number is 100,000. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING 84
(1984). Categories of substances marked with an asterisk (*) are currently
5
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Although this data is 20 years old, there is additional current
evidence. In the early 1990s NRC Committee members, in
response to being asked whether the report should be updated,
found that there was insufficient change in the data to justify
revisiting the 1984 findings.6 As recently as 1997, 75 percent of
the 3,000 chemicals produced in the highest volumes still lacked
basic toxicity data in the public record.7 This point about the
scientific ignorance of substances should neither be
overemphasized nor underemphasized. Although many
substances have been created, some of them likely have not been
pursued.8 Others will be industrial intermediates without
significant human exposures and some may be sufficiently large
molecules that they are not likely to pose toxicity problems
(although they may not be wholly risk free).9 Nonetheless, there
are a sufficiently large number of products in the market where
there is likely to be public and workforce exposure that citizens
should not rest easy. Wide anecdotal evidence suggests that the
public believes that products to which they are exposed are
legally required to be tested before they enter the market and
perhaps that scientists know as much about most substances as
they do about pharmaceutical products.10 However, as the data
shows, this suggestion is clearly mistaken.
Lack of scientific knowledge about the chemical universe
will complicate judicial review of testimony in toxic tort cases.

subject to premarket testing and approval. This probably accounts for
somewhat greater knowledge about them. James Huff & David Hoel,
Perspective and Overview of the Concepts and Value of Hazard Identification
as the Initial Phase of Risk Assessment for Cancer and Human Health, 18
SCAN. J. WORK ENVIRON HEALTH 83, 85 (1992) (estimating that 50,000100,000 exist chemicals in the marketplace).
6
John C. Bailor & Eula Bingham, personal communication, Annual
Meetings of the Collegium Ramazzini, (2002).
7
See DAVID ROE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC
IGNORANCE 7 (1997).
8
See Huff & Hoel, supra note 5.
9
Id.
10
This is a common view expressed by students in my classes and by
audiences to whom I give presentations.
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Experts likely will be forced to rely upon less than ideal
information to make inferences about whether exposure to a
substance can and did cause harm, because for any randomly
chosen substance there is probably poor toxicity data. In
particular, there will most likely be a shortage of good human
data, because, for a variety of reasons, human data will be
unavailable.11 This predicament forces scientists to infer any
toxicity properties of products based on more complex
evidentiary patterns such as animal evidence, chemical structurebiological activity evidence, mutagenicity studies,12 molecular
evidence and so on.13
II. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS
More complex patterns of evidence present increasing
challenges to reviewing scientific testimony because the kinds of
evidence and how they are combined in scientific arguments are
less familiar to those not steeped in the science. Nonetheless,
courts need to be prepared for the task because even complex
arguments can be quite good. In order to carry out their
gatekeeping duties and be fair to both sides of the bar, judges
will need to be able to understand the major outlines of such
arguments. In addition, scientific arguments pose their own
11

In particular, human evidence is likely to be missing for many
substances because often they have not been studied and human
epidemiological studies tend to be insensitive, See Huff & Hoel, supra note 5
(Table 2) and supra Section I.
12
Mutagency has been described as:
[t]he induction of mutations is due primarily to chemical or
physical aterations in the structure of DNA that result in
inaccurate replication of that region of the genome. The process
of mutagenesis consists of structural DNA alternation, cell
proliferation that fixes the DNA damage, and DNA repair that
either directly repairs the alkylated base or bases or results in
removal of larger segments of the DNA.
Henry C. Pitot III & Yvonne P. Dragan, Chemical Carcinogenesis, in
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 6th ed., 86 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed.,
McGraw-Hill 2001) at 241-319, esp. at 256.
13
See discussion infra at notes 148-61.
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difficulties.
Providing a causal explanation of an event is a matter of
inference and of argument. How does one infer the best
explanation of an event? Providing a philosophic account of
causal explanation is difficult enough on its own terms; some
philosophers emphasize the idea of making inferences to the best
explanation,14 some are Bayesians,15 and so on.16 This Section
will identify some of the major steps in inferences that are
common to the different approaches by which scientists come to
conclusions about the causal effects of exposures to substances.
The aim is to provide a sufficiently accurate overview of
nondeductive reasoning and to provide a characterization of such
inferences. This is then used to highlight some difficulties to
which courts must be alert in reviewing experts’ reasoning for
causal conclusions about toxicity. This Section focuses on causal
explanations of disease because this is especially germane to
courts’ tasks in toxic tort cases.
A. Deductive and Nondeductive Arguments
Arguments in support of conclusions are of two kinds:
deductive and nondeductive.17 Deductive arguments are typical
of mathematics and formal logic. The defining property of such
14

GILBERT HARMAN, The Inference to the Best Explanation, PHIL. REV.,
74, 89-90 (1964); LARRY WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING: AN INTRODUCTION
TO ANALYTICAL READING AND REASONING 206, 206-17 (2001). Thagard
adopts much of this view, indicating that scientists:
can infer that the factor causes the disease if this hypothesis is
part of the best explanation of the full range of evidence . . . .
[and that the factor that is identified as causing] the disease must
be a better explanation of the correlation between the factor and
the disease than the assertion that some other cause is
responsible for both the factor and the disease.
PAUL THAGARD, HOW SCIENTISTS EXPLAIN DISEASE 129 (1999).
15
See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC (1966).
16
This Article does not advocate on either side of the debate, nor does it
choose between different fundamental accounts.
17
LARRY WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING 38-46 (1989).
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arguments is that the conclusion is “guaranteed” logically or
semantically by the premises: if the premises are true, the
conclusion must be true.18 In a deductively valid argument, if
one finds the conclusion to be false, at least one of the premises
must be false as well. Or, if one accepts the truth of the
premises, but rejects the truth of the conclusion in a valid
argument, one contradicts oneself.19 For example, if one accepts
that A = B and B = C, but denies that A = C, on the face of
the argument one contradicts oneself. Logical tightness gives
deductive arguments great inferential power, as the success of
mathematics and formal logic shows.20 Deductive arguments are
of limited use in making empirical inferences about the world.21
By contrast, nondeductive arguments are simply those whose
conclusions are not guaranteed by their premises.22 These are
typically utilized in support of empirical claims,23 e.g., an
explanation of the ocean tides or of benzene causing leukemia.
Theorists have called such arguments “inferences to the best
explanation,” “diagnostic arguments,” “diagnostic induction,”
“inductive arguments,” and “differential diagnosis.”24 In
nondeductive arguments even if the premises are true, the
inferential link between premises and conclusions will have
varying degrees of strength, unlike a deductive argument.25
Thus, in a nondeductive argument the premises will provide
strong, weak, or moderate support for the conclusion; one might

18

Id.
Id. at 40.
20
Theorems of mathematics and formal logic are derived by deductive
reasoning.
21
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 38-46.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.; See also HARMAN, supra note 14, at 89 (noting that the term
“corresponds approximately to what others have called ‘abduction,’ ‘the
method of hypothesis,’ ‘hypothetic inference,’ ‘the method of elimination,’
‘eliminative induction,’ and ‘theoretical inference.’”), and SKYRMS, supra
note 15. This Article largely uses the phrase “inference to the best
explanation” because of the reasoning process it suggests.
25
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 38-46.
19
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say that the argument will be strong or weak or in between, but
not valid or invalid.26
Moreover, the given premises will provide support for
different possible conclusions (or as the literature puts it, the
evidence provided in the premises may be consistent with
different explanations).27 The task, then, in evaluating such
inferences is to determine which conclusion is the most plausible
(or best supported) given the premises (or which explanation
best accounts for the evidence in the premises).
B. Major Steps in Using Nondeductive Reasoning to Make
Inferences to the Best Explanation for Causes of
Disease
This Section highlights the major steps in using nondeductive
reasoning to make inferences concerning what may have caused
a disease. A typical first step that would lead to an interest in
disease causation is that a researcher may notice something that
needs understanding or calls for an explanation.28 This might be
a correlation or association between some exposure or condition
and a disease.29 Once such a correlation has been observed, it
invites an explanation, if it is sufficiently interesting.30 For
example, in a polyvinyl chloride plant in Kentucky in the mid1970s, occupational physicians noticed three individuals with
angiosarcoma of the liver (an extremely rare liver cancer).31

26

Id. at 48-50.
Id. at 107-11.
28
The reconstruction of nondeductive arguments is largely mine, but I
have learned a great deal from conversations with my colleague Larry Wright
and his books, especially WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at
99-121, WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, and THAGARD, HOW
SCIENTISTS EXPLAIN DISEASE, supra note 14.
29
Id.
30
The mere fact that there are correlations between two things often
provides something to be explained. See WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 17, at 154.
31
See generally J.L. Creech, Jr. & M.N. Johnson, Angiosarcoma of
Liver in the Manufacture of Polyvinyl Chloride, 16 JOURNAL OF
27
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Subsequently, they identified ten other cases at vinyl chloride
plants in the U.S.32 Questions posed about this phenomena
included: Does this observed correlation have a causal
explanation or not? If it does, what is it? In the law one would
ask, “If there is a causal explanation for an observed
association, is it one for which a responsible party should be
held accountable or not?”
Second, in trying to understand casual relationships a
researcher would consider a sufficiently complete list of
plausible explanations to account for the evidence.33 This
important step is one of the “most basic [yet] least understood”
and difficult steps in nondeductive inferences.34 For this step,
some philosophers would emphasize finding a list of plausible
explanations to try to account for the phenomena, and would
argue that this is based on scientists’ experience, expertise,
background knowledge, and other evidence of the effects.35
More Bayesian-oriented theorists would talk of conditioned
properties.36 When scientists sought to identify the cause of

OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 150 (1974).
32
Clark W. Heath, Jr., Henry Falk & John L. Creech, Jr.,
Characteristics of Cases of Angiosarcoma of the Liver among Vinyl Chloride
Workers in the United States, 246 ANNALS NEW YORK ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES 231 (1975).
33
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 99-102.
34
SKYRMS, supra note 15, at 107.
35
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 99-104, esp. 103.
36
Bayesian-oriented philosophers would, as Skyrms puts it, try to
ascertain:
[W]hat factors are likely to be relevant to the conditioned
property in which we are interested [the thing to be explained];
there must be some way of setting up a list of reasonable length
of possible conditioning properties, which probably contains the
necessary or sufficient conditions being sought. The only way to
do this is to apply inductive logic to previously acquired body of
evidence.
SKYRMS, supra note 15, at 107. Conditioning properties on Skyrms’ view are
those that produce a causal effect. His account of “conditioning properties”
may in fact be somewhat wider than “possible explanations” endorsed by the
other view, but this is not germane to our discussion (I owe this point to

CRANOR_2

16

3/3/2007 12:57 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

angiosarcoma at the polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plants, they had a
fortuitously short list of possible causes from which to seek an
explanation—excessive alcohol usage, exposure to arsenic
compounds, exposure to thorium dioxide, bad luck, and a
possible new cause, exposure to vinyl chloride monomers
(VCM).37 Frequently, the list of possible causes of an adverse
condition could be much longer or less well-defined.
Third, scientists would then rank the list of rival
explanations according to their plausibility or initial degree of
support based on the evidence available at the time.38 Such
evidence would include both evidence collected at the time of
the investigation and background knowledge about the subject
being studied.39 Plausibility rankings would refer to “the list of
rival explanations [to explain what is going on] in the order of
their plausibility.”40 Thus, “[w]hen we judge the [explanatory]
rivals [of nondeductive arguments] to be more or less plausible,
we are estimating how well or badly they explain what
happened, or what is going on, given what we know about it.”41
Such plausibility judgments have degrees of gradation or degrees
of strength.42 What was the most plausible initial explanation of
the liver cancer among polyvinyl chloride workers?
Fourth, the initial plausibility rankings would in turn provide
clues about what other evidence might be available that would
distinguish between the explanations.43 Scientists would seek
additional evidence to separate the more plausible from the less
Larry Wright).
37
Heath, et al., supra note 32, at 234; D. B. CLAYSON, TOXICOLOGICAL
CARCINOGENESIS 11–12 (2001).
38
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 93-96.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 101.
41
Id. at 107.
42
Id. at 47. Individuals can develop skills in ranking the different
conclusions from the premises based on their plausibility. Such skills are
quite important for scientists and the explanations they consider within their
fields. Courts need to recognize the importance of the implicit scientific skill
in recognizing and utilizing scientific inferences to the best explanation.
43
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-04.
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plausible explanations.44 What research in the form of tests,
studies, or background information could help discriminate
between different explanations and assist the search for a best
explanation?
Often, finding such information is much easier said than
done. Sometimes experiments cannot be conducted; studies
available may not directly address needed issues; diseases may
be sufficiently rare, or, conversely, sufficiently common that
they are difficult to detect; disease processes can be too complex
at present to discern causes and so on.45 This could be especially
problematic for the law where studies have not been explicitly
designed to address the legal questions. In the PVC plant case,
once researchers suspected that an occupational exposure might
have caused the cancers, they sought evidence from other PVC
plants as well as animal studies.46 They found some earlier
evidence that animals exposed to vinyl chloride contracted
similar diseases as well as 1972 preliminary results of a study by
Cesar Maltoni in Italy,47 which reinforced their considerable
initial concerns that had been based on case reports.
Fifth, there is widespread agreement that all relevant
information bearing on possible explanations must be considered
in drawing a conclusion about which explanation or conditioned
property is most likely.48 Scientifically “relevant information” is
44

Id.
THAGARD, supra note 14, at 131; CARL F. CRANOR, TOXICS TORTS;
SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (2006) 170-82.
46
GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE
DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 182-83 (2002).
47
Id. See also Cesare Maltoni, Occupational Carcinogenesis Predicitive
Value of Carcinogenesis Bioassays, 271 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 431
(1976).
48
See, e.g., THAGARD, supra note 14, at 129; SKYRMS, supra note 15,
at 107; Tom A. Hutchinson & David A. Lane, Assessing Methods for
Causality Assessment of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions, 42 J.CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOL. 5 (1989). See also Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil,
Inconsistency in Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in
the Courts, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1382, 1386 (Sept. 18, 2002) (noting writers
from different methodological perspectives who agree on this point).
Hutchinson and Lane put this point especially strongly:
45
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information that has any impact on the probability of a
scientist’s conclusions and the plausibility of explanations (or
conditioned properties).49 Relevance judgments may not always
be without controversy, but the standard for what constitutes
“relevant” information is quite minimal, since typically any
information that can affect a scientist’s belief, ranking of
possible explanations, probability of conditioned properties or
conclusions should be included.50 When trying to identify the
cause of angiosarcoma in PVC plants no epidemiological studies
were then available. However, there were good case reports
from the Kentucky plant, as well as a few from some other PVC
plants, revealing surprising clusters of an unusually rare
disease.51 Also, good animal studies from Maltoni’s laboratory
greatly assisted the inferences.52 All of this was relevant
evidence.53
What constitutes scientifically relevant information or data
for drawing a scientific conclusion is a matter of scientific

A causality assessment method must respect Fisher’s
fundamental rule of uncertain inference—never throw
information away. That is, any fact, theory or opinion that can
affect an evaluator’s belief that [a particular exposure] caused an
adverse event E must be incorporable by the method into the
‘state of information’ on which the assessment is based.
Hutchinson & Lane, supra at 10 (emphasis added).
49
See, e.g., WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104;
WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 13, at 206-17; SKYRMS, supra note
14.
50
Legal conceptions of “relevant” evidence are remarkably similar to
scientific definitions. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
541-542 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); FED. R. EVID. 401
(“Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”).
51
Heath, et. al., supra note 32, at 232.
52
MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 46, at 182-83 (Maltoni found that
cancers were produced in rats after vinyl chloride exposure at levels lower
than the existing occupational standard in the U.S.).
53
Maltoni, supra note 47.
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judgment.54 This is not intended to be a tautology, but to make
the point that scientists have the substantive expertise to assess
what is relevant for making scientific inferences.55 This is not to
say that a relevance judgment is totally subjective or that it can
be idiosyncratic; peers can correct other experts. Scientists may
differ about relevance judgments, but this is likely to be
unusual, simply because satisfying relevance considerations
tends to be quite easy.56 Finally, even in cases in which
scientific conclusions might be controversial, what constitutes
relevant data may be less controversial than the conclusions
drawn from the data.57
Sixth, central to drawing scientific conclusions is a need to
integrate all the available relevant evidence to come to a
conclusion.58 In assessing a substance’s toxicity, good scientific
practice dictates that scientists consider available human
evidence, evidence from experimental animals, chemical
structure-biological activity evidence, mechanistic evidence
(which is rarely available), and so on, in order to evaluate the
conclusion that follows.59 The metaphor of fitting the pieces of a
puzzle together to see what “picture” the totality of evidence
provides is often used to describe this process.60
54

WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104.
Id.
56
WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, at 206-17.
57
From the nature of relevance judgments one can see that they tend to
be much easier in science and the law than conclusions that might be drawn
from them. See WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104;
WRIGHT, CRITICAL THINKING, supra note 14, at 206–17; MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra, note 50, at 541-42.
58
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SAFETY OF DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
SAFETY (2005) at 255-56, 262.
59
V.J. Cogliano, R.A. Baan, K. Straif, Y. Grosse, M. Secretan, F. El
Ghissassi & P. Kleihues, The Science and Practice of Carcinogen
Identification and Evaluation, 112 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES
1269, 1272 (2004).
60
Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of
Science, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, (Suppl. 1) S66, S70
55
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At the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC),
for example, the scientific committees explicitly go through a
stepwise process. The committee considers any evidence that a
substance causes cancer in humans, and evidence that it causes
cancer in animal studies.61 These lines of evidence are then
combined to provide a default evaluation of the substance’s
likelihood of causing cancer in humans.62 The committee then
considers mechanistic and other kinds of evidence to “determine
whether the default evaluation should be modified.”63 The
current director of that program emphasizes the role of scientific
judgment in integrating evidence and coming to conclusions in
scientific argument. “The final overall evaluation is a matter of
scientific judgment, reflecting the weight of the evidence derived
from studies in humans, studies in experimental animals, and
mechanistic and other relevant data.”64
This view of the IARC process makes explicit that
professional judgment is central to drawing scientific inferences.
Moreover, scientific judgment has a crucial role at several
points, not just in drawing a final conclusion. An expert reviews
data that appear to bear on causal judgments, selects the
scientifically relevant data, assesses and weighs studies for their
quality, weighs the importance of different kinds of data vis-àvis one another (e.g., animal studies versus human studies
versus short-term studies versus structure-activity relationships
versus any case studies), and brings her background
understanding of biology and toxicology, as well as her
understanding of the phenomena, to the causal issues. She then
evaluates different possible explanations in light of all the
evidence and the particular phenomena (i.e., a disease) that she
wants to explain.
An expert considers and integrates all scientifically relevant
(Suppl. 1 2005); Margaret A. Berger, “What Has a Decade of Daubert
Wrought?” 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH S59, S60 (Suppl. 1
2005).
61
Cogliano et. al., supra note 59.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. (emphasis added).
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evidence in order to assess what it shows. Then the expert enters
into an assessment of the strength of the best explanation vis-àvis alternative explanations. As both medical and legal
commentators put the point: “In the final analysis, assessment of
evidence and causal inferences depend on accumulating all
potentially relevant evidence and making a subjective judgment
about the strength of the evidence.”65 When professional
judgment is so central to the drawing of inferences,
professionals may disagree.
Finally, the search for causal understanding takes into
account all relevant information, and focuses on how much more
probable or plausible an effect is with a cause than without that
cause.66 For example, was it more plausible that employees in
the polyvinyl chloride plants contracted their liver cancer as a
matter of coincidence or from exposure to thorium oxide,
alcohol consumption, arsenic compounds, or the vinyl chloride
monomer? In pursuit of the best explanation, a scientist would
seek evidence that would increase the plausibility “gap” between
the highest ranked explanation and the next highest ranked one.
That is, during an investigation, the initially top-ranked
explanation may gain in strength and plausibility. Alternatively it
may lose strength, and, thus, the gap between it and other
possible explanations would narrow (or even disappear
altogether), which shows that its strength and plausibility
compared with rival explanations is weakening (or the others
have risen in plausibility).67 If the evidence supports one
plausible explanation so overwhelmingly that one can reject all
other explanations, this would be more a matter of good fortune
than occurs in typical nondeductive arguments.68 If two
65

Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 48, at 1384. See also Jerome P.
Kassirer, “Diagnostic Reasoning,” Annals of Internal Medicine 110, 893-900
(1989); JEROME P. KASSIRER & R. I. KOPELMAN, LEARNING CLINICAL
REASONING (Williams and Wilkins 1991).
66
Thagard, supra note 14, at 102; WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING,
supra note 17, at 107.
67
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-06.
68
For example, HARMAN, supra note 14, at 89-90, seems to be thinking
of easy cases of nondeductive arguments in which one explanation is so
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hypotheses have approximately the same plausibility, there might
be no “best” explanation, but rather two equally plausible rival
explanations.69
The overall strategy sketched above in the search for
explanations is broadly similar across many fields that utilize
nondeductive arguments. It is widely endorsed by
epidemiologists,70 toxicologists, methodologists inferring causes
from well-analyzed case studies,71 governmental scientists
assessing risks, investigators seeking to explain airplane or space
shuttle accidents, and ordinary persons making empirical
inferences.72
C. Weight-of-the-Evidence Arguments
The strength of scientific inferences depends both on the
truth of the evidentiary claims in the premises and on the
cumulative support that all the relevant evidence contained in the
premises offers for the conclusions in question.73 Another name
for these arguments is “weight-of-the-evidence” arguments.74

superior to all others that one can properly be said to reject them. One
explanation can be better than another without rejecting the second.
69
This point follows from Wright’s analysis at WRIGHT, PRACTICAL
REASONING, supra note 17, at 103-06.
70
Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation? 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295, 300 (1965), reprinted in
EVOLUTION OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC IDEAS: ANNOTATED READINGS ON CONCEPTS
AND METHODS 15-20 (Sander Greenland ed. 1987). See also Douglas Weed,
Underdetermination and Incommensurability in Contemporary Epidemiology,
7 KENNEDY INSTI. ETHICS J. 107, 114 (1997).
71
See, e.g., Hutchinson & Lane, supra note 48, at 12.
72
For a regulatory use of such inferences, see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment,
61 Fed. Reg.17, 960, 17,961 (Apr. 23, 1996) (to replace 51 Fed. Reg. 33992
when finalized). One can easily become aware of the implicit nondeductive
arguments in use around us by noticing the argument form.
73
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 49.
74
This is a term often used in regulatory settings, but is not restricted to
them. Scientists often speak of what conclusion the “weight of the evidence
supports.” Frequent conversations with David A. Eastmond, Chair,
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This is a term from both scientific and regulatory contexts.75
The metaphor “weight-of-the-evidence” is intended to convey
the persuasiveness of the kind and amount of evidence in favor
of different conclusions. In regulatory science, for example,
researchers might be concerned whether a substance is a human
carcinogen. In such circumstances, scientists consider which
rival conclusions are better supported by the weight of available
evidence: Is the substance a human carcinogen; is it is a
probable human carcinogen; is the evidence so equivocal that
one cannot decide; or is it not a human carcinogen at all? The
implicit question to be addressed is whether the weight of the
available scientific evidence better supports the claim that a
substance causes (or contributes to), or more likely than not
causes (or contributes to) cancer or to support some other
claim.76 Scientists assessing the most likely cause of
angiosarcoma in PVC plants concluded that the strongest
explanation, which was quite good, was exposure to vinyl
chloride monomers.77
D. Example: Plaintiffs’ Argument in Allen v. Pennsylvania
Engineering
To further illustrate the points about scientific arguments,
consider in schematic outline an argument offered by plaintiffs
in Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering.78 This statement of their
Environmental Toxicology, University of California, Riverside.
75
For example, IARC researchers note that for the conclusions of a
consensus scientific committee “the final overall evaluation [of evidence that
a substance is carcinogenic to humans] is a matter of scientific judgment,
reflecting the weight of the evidence derived from studies in humans, studies
in experimental animals, and mechanistic and other relevant data.” Cogliano
et al., supra note 59, at 1272 (emphasis added).
76
For a discussion of the weight of the evidence procedure, see the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, 61 FED. REG.17,960, 17,961 (Apr. 23, 1996) (to replace 51
Fed. Reg. 33992 when finalized).
77
Heath et. al., supra note 32.
78
102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996). This statement of their argument is
truncated and does not do it full justice, but it illustrates the points above.

CRANOR_2

24

3/3/2007 12:57 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

argument is truncated and does not do it full justice, but it
illustrates the above mentioned points.
1. Walter Allen was periodically, but sporadically,
exposed to ethylene oxide (ETO), a sterilizing agent,
while changing ETO cylinders on hospital sterilizing
units over a 20-year period; he contracted brain cancer
(“BC”).
2. Rat studies, but not mice studies, show that ETO
causes comparatively rare BC and that it can cross the
blood-brain barrier.
3. Several small human studies with low exposures
suggest that ETO is associated with BC. A large metaanalysis shows no association.
4. ETO is a small molecule, a direct-acting alkylating
agent (it interferes with DNA), and a multisite
mutagen.
There are clearly several possible conclusions to this
argument for general causation:
5a. It is more likely than not that ETO can cause human
brain cancer.
5b. It is not more likely than not that ETO can cause
human brain cancer.
5c. One cannot draw any very definitive conclusion from
the data.
In addition, there are several possible conclusions concerning
specific causation (addressing the question of whether Mr.
Allen’s brain cancer was likely caused by his exposure to
ethylene oxide). Clearly, one would need to have some more
developed premises concerning the extent of his exposure, but
the possible conclusions concerning specific causation would be
the following:
6a. It is more likely than not that ETO caused or
contributed to Mr. Allen’s BC.
6b. It is more likely that something else caused his BC:
bad luck, unlucky genes, some other exposure, and so
on.
6c. One cannot draw any very definitive inference about
what caused his BC.
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In addition to the premises of these arguments supporting
several possible conclusions, plaintiffs’ experts presented several
different kinds of evidence as scientifically relevant to the
inferences they needed to make, e.g., human, molecular and
animal evidence in particular.79 This evidence, together with
exposure information taken together, they argued, more likely
than not showed that ETO can cause brain cancer and did cause
brain cancer in Mr. Allen.80
III. WHAT PROBLEMS MIGHT NONDEDUCTIVE INFERENCES POSE
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Scientific arguments are not readily accessible to those not
steeped in the substantive scientific fields, nor are they easy to
evaluate. They have several features that make their assessment
more difficult for those who are more distant from them on a
day-to-day basis. First, nondeductive arguments will always
have gaps between their premises and their conclusions. This is
readily apparent in the arguments from Allen.81 Courts will need
to recognize that scientific arguments have such gaps and not
expect deductive “tightness” in them.
Second, in utilizing scientific arguments, scientists consider
all the scientifically relevant evidence in drawing their
conclusions. There can be, I believe, temptations for those not
familiar with the scientific substance of such arguments to not
consider some pieces of evidence because they appear not to
support conclusions by themselves or to contribute too little to
conclusions. For example, Mr. Allen’s experts were not
permitted to utilize all of the scientifically relevant evidence in
their argument because the court rejected the various pieces of
evidence individually.82 Thus, courts sometimes seem to struggle

79

Id. at 196.
Expert report by Karl T. Kelsey and Anthony D. LaMontagne for
plaintiffs (October 13, 1992) in Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d
194 (5th Cir. 1996).
81
See supra Section II.D.
82
Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d at 198.
80

CRANOR_2

3/3/2007 12:57 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

26

with scientifically relevant evidence on which scientists typically
rely, or to review each “piece” of evidence for whether it
strongly supports plaintiffs’ ultimate causal conclusion.83 Finally,
in drawing conclusions, scientists consider all the relevant
evidence as an integrated whole.84 Since scientists view the
evidence as a whole, courts will need to recognize this and
assess the evidence as an integrated whole when reviewing
expert testimony for admissibility (the Allen court did not permit
this).85 This does not ease courts’ tasks, but arguably makes
them more difficult because judges must review the scientific
substance of an expert’s argument (taking account of all the
relevant evidence) to ensure that it is sufficiently plausible to
assist a jury.
A. Gaps in Scientific Arguments
All nondeductive arguments will have gaps because there is
no logically tight relationship between premises and
conclusion.86 The gaps in the argument from Allen v.
Pennsylvania Engineering exist not merely because I presented a
brief statement of more elaborate arguments. The gaps are
traceable to the structure of the arguments themselves.87 Even
the best inferences can appear to have gaps, simply because it is
easy to conceive alternative conclusions to the arguments.
For example, no matter how well established Newtonian
gravitational theory is to describe the attraction of physical
objects on the surface of the earth and near celestial bodies, one
83

Id.
See supra Section II.C.
85
Courts must conduct reviews in this manner, if they are to assess
scientific arguments (testimony) as scientists do.
86
Supra Section II.A.
87
There is no logically tight relationship between premises and
conclusion. Moreover, there is a more subtle point: how elaborate and
detailed such arguments need to be presented very much depends upon the
substantive understanding of those to whom the argument is addressed.
Comparable experts will need less elaborate arguments than less well
informed readers.
84
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might easily ask whether it applies to far away bodies with
which we are not familiar.88 For another example, a well-known
astronomer, Thomas Gold, contrary to well-grounded views in
geology, argued until his death that oil does not come from
decomposed organic matter (such as plants and dinosaurs), but
from geologic processes deep within the earth’s core.89 Also, no
matter how well established evolution is, any relationships
between premises based on existing evidence and conclusions
are not so “tight” as to deter some from easily suggesting
alternative theological explanations for the observed phenomena.
This does not mean they are right, only that it is comparatively
easy to imagine or find some kinds of gaps in the argument.
The possibility of gaps provides openings for skepticism
about nondeductive arguments and may raise judicial concerns
about them.90 If premises support alternative conclusions, this
can easily invite skepticism about a particular conclusion a
scientist has drawn, even if the challenge is not particularly
well-founded by evidence. It is effortless to be a skeptic; one
needs only to suggest a different possible conclusion to the
argument or notice a gap in the argument and exploit it.91 The
possibility of skepticism toward scientific arguments may
reinforce any natural skepticism judges have toward the
arguments of adversarial counsel and experts. Moreover, the
obvious gaps in arguments will likely increase difficulties courts
will have in reviewing them because it will correctly appear that
88

At one time I suggested this as a speculative comment. However, in
recent years, two physicists, Mordehai Hilgrom and Jacop Bekenstein, have
proposed that the appropriate force equations for certain very distant galaxies
is F=ma2/a0 (where F is force, m is the mass of the object, a2 is acceleration
and a0 is a cosmological constant) instead of F=ma (force equals mass times
acceleration). This view would modify early Newtonian views. Adam Frank,
Gravity’s Gadfly, DISCOVER: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE, 3237 (August 2006).
89
Lissa Harris, CU’s Thomas Gold, noted astronomer and ‘gadfly,’ is
CHRON.
(Jul. 1,2004),
available
at
dead
at
84,
CORNELL
http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/04/7.1.04/Tom.Gold.obit.html.
90
This was a concern of the Supreme Court in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
91
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 104.
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every such argument has a gap. However, the mere presence of
gaps alone should not disqualify a scientific argument from
being presented to a jury because every nondeductive argument
has a gap. The challenge for courts is to review arguments in an
informed and thoughtful manner.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, a gap in plaintiffs’
argument was a concern of the district court (and ultimately the
Supreme Court) in reviewing Joiner’s weight-of-the-evidence
argument (inference to the best explanation) that he had
contracted lung cancer at least in part because of exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).92 The Court noticed a “gap”
between plaintiff’s animal evidence and the experts’ opinion.93 It
urged that there could be too great a “gap” between data on
which experts rely and a scientist’s opinion testimony.94 But if
there is always some gap, how should judges review such
arguments? Moreover, can they review expert testimony without
comparing plaintiff’s conclusions with defendant’s conclusions,
as the original Daubert decision cautioned against?
First, not every nondeductive argument admits of legitimate
critique simply because it has a gap. Some will be quite solid
and strong—oil comes from decomposed organic matter—or
some even implausible—Martians caused the space shuttle
Challenger disaster. Second, in reviewing expert arguments
courts will need to consider a scientist’s conclusion in relation to
the data and information on which it is based, but they should
only consider a conclusion in relation to the evidence in the
argument in order to assess arguments as scientists would.
Good argument evaluation would not license the conclusion
to be considered in isolation from all the scientifically relevant
evidentiary premises in support of it.95 Moreover, the law on the
admissibility of evidence does not permit a comparison between
plaintiff’s conclusion (or argument) and defendant’s scientific

92

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 146 (1997).
Id.
94
Id. The Court’s reaction to this evidence was likely an overreaction.
See CRANOR, supra note 45.
95
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 114.
93
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conclusion (or argument), unless there is simply no issue of
material fact to be resolved between parties.96 Thus, for
admissibility a judge would need to make some minimal
assessment of the strength of a scientist’s nondeductive argument
to see whether it is sufficiently minimally plausible for legal
purposes.97 Following this step, some courts, beginning with the
Daubert litigation and subsequent to it, appear to have engaged
in a comparative weighing of plaintiff’s evidence with
defendant’s evidence prior to trial, but that is controversial,
simply because it appears to intrude on the jury’s authority.98
There can be arguments, of course, in which all the data on
which experts rely so poorly support the inferences drawn that
one might say they have no support at all. When this occurs it is
probably better to say not that there is “too great a gap between
data and the conclusions drawn from them,” but, rather, that the
conclusion is simply too “speculative” given the evidence in the
premises.99
96

FED. R. CIV. P., 56 C.
See also supra Section IV.
98
See, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 131 (Ariz. 2000) (“The
Daubert/Joiner/Kumho trilogy of cases . . . puts the judge in the position of
passing on the weight or credibility of the expert’s testimony, something we
believe crosses the line between the legal task of ruling on the foundation and
relevance of evidence and the jury’s function of whom to believe and why,
whose testimony to accept, and on what basis.”); Howerton v. Arai Helmet,
Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 692 (N.C. 2004) (“[T]rial courts asserting. . .authority
under Daubert may unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionallymandated function of the jury to decide issues of fact and to assess the weight
of the evidence.”); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 472 (Wyo. 1999)
(adopting Daubert, but nonetheless expressing concern that applying the
Daubert approach to exclude evidence has been criticized as a
“misappropriation of the jury’s responsibilities,” and that “‘it is imperative
that the jury retain its fact-finding function’” (quoting Springfield v. State,
860 P.2d 435 (Wyo.1993)); Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp.
2d 1291, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (applying Daubert, but noting that the jury’s
right to decide the facts of the case is usurped when a trial court
“overreach[es] in the gatekeeping function” and “determine[s] whether the
opinion evidence is correct or worthy of credence.”).
99
Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving
Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 236 (2000).
97
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B. Potential Problems with Scientific Relevance
A second set of potential problems with scientific inferences
concerns the scientific relevance of studies, data, and
information on which an expert bases her testimony. Courts
have had some difficulties with animal studies, case reports and
molecular evidence. A generic difficulty appears to be that
courts have engaged in assessing individual pieces of evidence as
a means of reviewing an experts’ overall testimony (or
argument).100 Such a method for analyzing scientific arguments
confuses an assessment of the overall argument with an
assessment of one piece of the evidence (or one premise) in the
argument.101 It conflates the analysis of the argument as a whole
with analysis of the evidence in one premise of the argument.
Such an approach is fraught with numerous difficulties.
In order to see these difficulties, several distinct questions
should be introduced. First, is a particular piece of evidence
relevant to assist a scientific inference about toxicity? Second, if
it is scientifically relevant, how much weight or (in legal terms)
probative value does, and should, it have in an overall inference
about toxicity?102 Third, does one piece of evidence taken by
itself provide sufficient support for a scientist’s toxicity
conclusion?103 Finally, does all the relevant evidence considered
provide a sufficiently plausible argument for the expert’s
conclusion, so he or she may be admitted to testify to assist the
jury? Failure to distinguish at least these four questions can
contribute to confusion about the issues and frustrate
scientifically accurate reviews of expert testimony.
One issue is whether a piece of scientific evidence is
scientifically relevant to an inference of toxicity or to a
100

As explained below, this clearly occurred in Allen v. Pa. Eng’g
Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996), and seemed to be endorsed by the
Supreme Court in General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-46 (1997),
which led Justice Stevens to register his dissent at 150-55.
101
Confusing court language in the original Daubert decision as well as
subsequent commentary and court decisions has contributed to this.
102
WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 123.
103
Id.
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judgment of the relative plausibility of different explanations of
the evidence. As noted above, it should be easy for evidence to
satisfy the relevance criteria—if it would have any impact,
positive or negative, on the plausibility of different explanations,
it is relevant.
Before introducing the other points, reconsider the argument
from Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering.104 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed a judge’s exclusion of plaintiffs’
experts.105 The court of appeals held that epidemiological studies
did not show ETO caused or contributed to brain cancer in
humans.106 Next, referring to Brock v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc,107 the Court noted that animal studies
“must be carefully qualified in order to have explanatory
potential for human beings.”108 Then, quoting defense experts,
the court argued that the rat studies could not be reliably
extrapolated to humans, holding that studies showing that rats
contracted brain cancer, “furnishes at best speculative support
for appellants’ causation theory.”109 Finally, the Court argued
that while the cell biology shows ETO to have mutagenic and
genotoxic properties in living systems, this does not necessarily
show it can cause brain cancer in humans or did cause brain
cancer in Mr. Allen.110 The court concluded: “[N]one of the
104

See supra Section II.D.
Plaintiffs used a more elaborate version of the argument sketched
above in supra Section II.D.
106
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (“First,
although occupational exposure to ETO has been studied for many years, not
a single scientific study has revealed a link between human brain cancer and
ETO exposure.”).
107
Brock v. Merrill-Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir.
1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989).
108
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d at 197.
109
Id. (“[T]he lack of capacity for the F-344 rat to predict how even the
mouse model responds necessarily undercuts confidence that the rat will
predict accurately how other species including humans will respond [to EtO
exposure].”).
110
Id. at 198. (“Third, the cell biology data show only that ETO has
mutagenic and genotoxic capabilities in living organisms, not that it
necessarily causes brain cancer in humans or in Allen’s particular case. That
105
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scientific data on which appellants’ experts rely furnishes a
scientifically valid basis for the conclusion they would draw.
The paucity of epidemiological evidence, the unreliability of
animal studies, and the inconclusiveness of cell biology combine
to undercut the expert testimony.”111
We see in this decision some court language that is fairly
common. Instead of assessing the scientists’ argument (their
testimony) based on all the relevant evidence, the court
addressed each piece of evidence by itself. One reason for this
approach may be that the judges were concerned about the
scientific relevance of the individual pieces of evidence to the
expert’s arguments, and whether plaintiffs’ expert could use
them to draw a conclusion. They did not use this language,
however.
Moreover, given the idea of scientific relevance, judges
should exercise considerable care in assessing whether individual
pieces of evidence are scientifically relevant, simply because
they are so intellectually distant from the relevant fields and
because criteria of both scientific and legal relevance are easy to
satisfy.112 Of course, they could query experts on such issues
and inquire about how the evidence might affect (however
slightly) their argument.113 That is, they could ask, “How does
this piece of evidence contribute (however slightly) to your
argument?”
Could the judges in Allen have been concerned that each
piece of evidence was so poor that it could not even have been
scientifically relevant for the toxicity judgment? Their assertions
about animal evidence could have been so construed: they held
that the fact that ethylene oxide caused brain tumors in rats
could not be evidence for the claim that ETO could cause brain
tumors in humans, simply because ETO did not correspondingly
ETO may have these effects on living cells or genes is the beginning, not the
end of the scientific inquiry and proves nothing about causation without other
scientific evidence.”).
111
Id.
112
See supra notes 49-50.
113
They would in effect have a discussion on how such evidence was
relevant to the conclusion for which they argued.
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cause brain tumors in phylogenetically similar mice.114 That is,
they might have believed the rat evidence was simply
scientifically irrelevant to humans. Had they explicitly used such
an argument that would have been clearer. However, if this was
their concern, there is independent evidence that they were
mistaken on scientific grounds.115 This is a risk of non-scientists
reviewing the details of scientific arguments.
The court might not have understood (because it was too
distant from the science), or plaintiffs might not have adequately
114

Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996).
As part of an NSF-funded research project at UC Riverside, David
Eastmond and I sought scientific peer reviews of expert reports in a small
number of legal cases. Allen was one. We sent the plaintiffs’ and defendants’
expert reports without names or affiliations attached to two extramural
referees who were experts in the toxicology of ETO and one epidemiologist.
Following the lead of some federal judges and the language from Kumho Tire
we asked them whether the experts’ opinions fell within a range where
“reasonable experts would disagree.” Both an industry oriented scientist and
a non-industry scientist agreed that plaintiffs presented good scientific
arguments that ethylene more likely than not could cause brain cancer.
Consider just one expert’s view.
The evidence presented by these experts clearly establishes ETO as a
carcinogen with a high likelihood of human risk. They appropriately cited
literature showing that ETO is a direct-acting DNA alkylating agent, is
mutagenic in multiple in vivo and in vitro studies including human cells, and
consistently showed induction of chromosomal damage in peripheral
lymphocytes of exposed workers (chromosomal aberrations, sister chromatid
exchanges, and micronuclei). ETO also induces heritable translocations in
rodents (not mentioned by the plaintiff’s experts). The plaintiff’s experts also
cited studies showing tumor induction at multiple sites, including brain, in
male and female rats exposed to EtO, and they cited studies demonstrating
that EtO forms DNA adducts in the brain. The latter piece of information is
important because it demonstrates that EtO can cross the blood brain barrier.
(Peer review of plaintiffs’ expert’s report by anonymous reviewer, Jan. 12,
2004) (any emphases in the original).
Moreover, one expert noted (and then went on to illustrate the view) that
“The defendant’s experts made several unjustified assumptions and
misstatements to support their contention that the plaintiff’s brain tumor was
not due to exposure to ETO.” (Peer review of defendants’ expert’s report by
anonymous reviewer, Jan. 12, 2004). This issue is discussed more fully in
CRANOR, supra note 45 at 324-28.
115
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explained, the significance of the rat studies even in the absence
of similar results from mouse studies. It can be argued that in
this case rats would be a better model for predicting effects in
humans simply because rats generally have a slower metabolism
and breathing rate than mice, thus retaining ETO in their bodies
more like humans.116 The rat studies also show that the small
molecule of ethylene oxide can cross the blood-brain barrier,
something that it is typically difficult for chemicals to do.117
If ETO can have this biological effect in rats, which have a
metabolism that is more similar to humans than mice, it is
plausible that ETO can have this biological effect in humans,
which is what plaintiffs had argued.118 Toxicologists would
explain ethylene oxide’s inability to cross the mouse blood-brain
barrier as based on special features of mice that make them
different from rats and humans.119 By contrast, rats’ slower
metabolism and respiratory rates would result in them retaining
ETO longer, giving that small molecule time for absorption into
various tissues, including the brain.120 The Allen court seemed to
assume that there was something special about rats, which was
not applicable to mice and to humans, when the opposite appears
to be true: the mice have special features that distinguish them
116

Interview with David A. Eastmond, (June 2003).
The blood-brain barrier can be characterized as one that:
is not an absolute barrier to the passage of toxic agents into the
CNS [Central Nervous System]. Instead, it represents a site that
is less permeable than are most other areas of the body.
Nevertheless, many poisons do not enter the brain in appreciable
quantities because of this barrier.
Karl K. Rozman & Curtis D. Klasassen, Absorption, Distribution, and
Excretion of Toxicants, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 6th ed., 86
(Curtis D. Klaassen ed., McGraw-Hill 2001) 107-32, 122. The blood-brain
barrier is a physiological barrier that seems to have evolved to provide
protections to the brain. Id. at 122-23.
118
Karl T. Kelsey & Anthony D. LaMontagne, Plaintiff’s Expert
Opinion Aff.; Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir.
1996).
119
Interview with David A. Eastmond, Chair, Environmental
Toxicology, University of California, Riverside, May 2003.
120
Id.
117
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from rats and make their responses less applicable to humans.121
However, the court did not use the language of relevance,
but instead sometimes asked whether each piece of evidence was
reliable.122 This suggests its concern might have been a) whether
one piece of evidence is or can be sufficiently reliable by itself
to support an expert’s overall conclusion, perhaps b) whether by
itself it can provide major support for a conclusion or maybe c)
whether it unerringly contributes support to a conclusion.123
Despite some passages in the Supreme Court’s Daubert opinion,
the discussion of animal evidence in Joiner and some other
courts’ opinions, this is puzzling. No single piece of evidence
about toxicity is ever likely to support a conclusion—such an
expectation is both scientifically mistaken and an unreasonable
interpretation of nondeductive arguments.124 Moreover, if a
scientist or a court can challenge each piece of evidence
individually as insufficiently reliable to support an expert’s
conclusion, this would almost certainly undermine every
scientific argument because they are typically based on multiple
premises (pieces of evidence) in support of conclusions
For example, Watson and Crick’s well-known paper on the
structure of DNA rested on several considerations that
individually seemed like comparatively weak evidence.125
However, taken together, Susan Haack argues, the evidence
supports an inference concerning the “structure of DNA [that] is
very well warranted (in fact, the only entry that fits).”126 This

121
122

CRANOR, supra note 45, at 325.
Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir.

1996).
123

See id. at 197-98 (discussing possibilities of interpretation).
In a typical argument a single piece of evidence might appear to be
very important (and in fact can be very important), but it typically has this
significance because of the presence of other pieces of evidence utilized in the
inference. See Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance
and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need
for Liability Reform?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 34-41 (2001). See also
CRANOR, supra note 45, at 313-14 for discussion of some examples.
125
See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
126
Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-bush: At the Supreme
124
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argument, as we now know, has revolutionized biology. Had the
review procedures of some judges been applied to this groundbreaking paper, it might have died a premature and mistaken
death.
Finally, no kind of evidence—epidemiological, animal, or
molecular studies—unerringly supports a conclusion concerning
toxicity. Whether a particular piece of evidence does contribute
to a conclusion depends upon what it shows, as well as the other
evidence utilized in the argument. Sometimes molecular
evidence can be quite strong as it is for the toxicity of ethylene
oxide127 and sometimes not. Sometimes case reports can be
especially strong evidence as they were in identifying the
toxicity of vinyl chloride and sometimes not.128
There is a cluster of deeper and more disturbing issues.

Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L 217, 237 (2001). See
also supra note 102.
127
See discussion and accompanying supra infra notes 77-79.
128
The idea of reliable evidence is puzzling and troubling as it has come
to be utilized in legal decisions. The Court in Daubert might have had in
mind the reliability of underlying tests in support of a legal case as
defendants argued the blood pressure test was reliable in Frye. This was a
test or technique that directly addressed one of the key legal issues of that
case—was the defendant telling the truth? Moreover, it is possible that such a
test could be quite accurate, e.g., 90 percent accurate, in providing evidence
about who was telling the truth and who was lying, but of course it was not.
However, using reviews of such techniques as an analogy for reviewing a
variety of pieces of evidence that would assist scientists in coming to
judgments about the toxicity of a substance is likely to be misleading.
Sometimes individual structure-activity or mechanistic evidence can quite
helpful in assessing the toxicity of a product when combined with other
information and sometimes not. CRANOR, supra note 45, at 111-15, 245-48.
Sometimes an epidemiological study will be very helpful when it shows a
positive association between exposure and disease and sometimes not. Usually
negative or “no effect” epidemiological studies are quite misleading if they
are taken to provide evidence that there is no adverse effect from exposure.
Id. at 27, 243-45, 264, 277. Individual pieces of toxicity evidence do not lend
themselves readily to being judged “reliable” or not for the ultimate toxicity
questions; their contribution to a toxicity judgment is properly assessed in the
presence of all the other evidence in support of a toxicity claim and how well
all the evidence taken together supports the toxicity conclusion.
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Several courts appear to have rejected whole categories or kinds
of evidence as insufficiently reliable to support a scientist’s
conclusions. Some have rejected animal studies, and molecular
evidence, and many have rejected human case reports.129 Each
of these can easily be scientifically relevant evidence,
well-endorsed by scientists, and, depending upon the other
evidence available in a particular case, each can be especially
powerful.
1. Animal Studies
A variety of considerations point to the scientific relevance
and probative value of animal studies in making toxicity
judgments. National and international consensus scientific
committees routinely rely upon animal evidence for judging the
toxicity of substances. Consider carcinogens as an example,
which is an especially well developed area. The International
Agency for Research on Cancer lists about sixty-six substances
or groups of substances, excluding mixtures and exposure
conditions, as probable human carcinogens.130 For more than
129

On animal studies, for example, consider two cases: Plaintiff’s expert
. . . relied on a study of the effect of picloram on rats that
showed that when exposed to large amounts of the chemical, the
rats developed cancerous tumors and died. He admitted that the
effects of chemicals differ between humans and rats . . . . We
then are left to conclude that the study, at most, is only evidence
that picloram may produce some unidentified effect on humans.
Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987). “The animal
studies are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different
biological species. They are of so little probative force and are so potentially
misleading as to be inadmissible.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). For some discussion of case
reports see CRANOR, supra note 45, at 256-57 and Section B.3 infra, at notes
162-80. Other courts have admitted testimony based on animal studies. Some
of these are summarized in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 780 (3d Cir. 1994).
130
IARC, Overall Evaluation of Carcinogenicity to Humans, Group 2A:
Probably Carcinogenic to Humans, Group 2A: Probably Carcinogenic to
Humans, MONOGRAPH SERIES. REV. (July 7, 2004); available at
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forty of these substances (about 60 percent), evidence of
carcinogenicity in humans is inadequate or limited.131
Nonetheless, the overall classification is based on sufficient
evidence in animal studies plus “other data relevant to the
evaluation of carcinogenicity and its mechanisms.”132 The U.S.
National Toxicology Program lists about 185 substances as
“reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.” Of these, a
large percentage has been identified on the basis of good animal
studies.133 This has been confirmed by agency personnel.134
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) classifies
substances as probable human carcinogens based upon animal
studies, even if the evidence that a substance is carcinogenic to
humans is inadequate.135 These are substances “likely to produce
cancer in humans due to the production or anticipated production
of tumors by modes of action that are relevant or assumed to be
relevant to human carcinogenicity.”136
Scientific principles underscore the importance of animal
studies and point to the foundation for the use of animal studies
described above. Huff and Rall summarize considerable science:
From data available so far, therefore, it appears that
chemicals that are carcinogenic in laboratory animals
are likely to be carcinogenic in human populations
and that, if appropriate studies can be performed,
httyp://www-cie.iarc.fr/moneval/crthgr02a.htm (listing 66 substances that are
known human carcinogens).
131
That is, studies would be of insufficient quality to permit an inference
concerning human carcinogenicity, or the association is credible, but
alternative explanations of the positive results cannot be ruled out with
sufficient confidence to justify a causal inference. See id.
132
See id.
133
Criteria were first listed and published on September 26, 1996, and
are listed at the NTP Web site, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntpweb/
index.cfm?objectid=03C9CE38-E5CD-EE56-D21B9.
134
Interview with Ronald Melnick, National Institute of Environmental
Health Science, in Brooklyn N.Y. (March 3, 2006).
135
Environmental Protection Agency Proposed Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17, 17960, 17985 (Apr. 23,
1996).
136
Id.
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there is qualitative predictability. Also, there is
evidence that there can be a quantitative relationship
between the amount of a chemical that is carcinogenic
in laboratory animals and that which is carcinogenic
in human populations.137
This conclusion is supported by more specific relationships
identified by scientists. Although there are readily apparent
differences between laboratory animals and humans (such as
external physical characteristics, lifespan, metabolic rate, and
heterogeneity) that too often receive greater attention than
similarities, “experimental evidence to date certainly suggests
that there are more physiologic, biochemical and metabolic
similarities between laboratory animals and humans than there
are differences.”138 The “biological processes of molecular,
cellular, tissue, and organ functions that control life are
strikingly similar from one mammalian species to another.”139 In
addition, based upon current information, there is great
similarity in the carcinogenic processes between animals and
humans.140 Furthermore, “the more we know about the
similarities of structure and function of higher organisms at the
molecular level, the more we are convinced that mechanisms of
chemical toxicity are, to a large extent, identical in animals and
man.”141 The toxicology authors in the Federal Judicial Center
Manual on Scientific Evidence and the EPA agree.142 A 2005

137

James Huff & David P. Rall, Relevance to Humans of Carcinogenesis
Results from Laboratory Animal Toxicology Studies, in Maxcy-Rosenau Last
Public Health & Preventive Medicine 433, 437 (John M. Last & Robert B.
Wallace eds., 13th ed. 1992).
138
David P. Rall et al., Alternatives to Using Human Experience in
Assessing Health Risks, 8 ANN. REV. PUBL. HEALTH 355, 356 (1987).
139
Id. at 434.
140
Some researchers make even stronger claims. For example, see James
Huff, Chemicals and Cancer in Humans: First Evidence in Experimental
Animals, 100 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 201, 204 (1993) (stating that the array
and multiplicity of carcinogenic processes are virtually common among
mammals, for instance between laboratory rodents and humans).
141
Id. at 204.
142
See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary S. Henifin, Reference Guide on
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Institute of Medicine and National Research Council report gives
animal studies a strong endorsement, echoing numerous earlier
reports. According to this report, animal studies are:
powerful because controlled studies can be conducted
to predict effects that might not be detected from
customary use by humans until they result in overt
harmful effects. Animal studies are especially useful
in detecting effects of chronic exposures and effects
on reproductive and developmental processes because
epidemiological methods of studying humans are
especially problematic in these areas . . . .143
Recall also how animal studies were especially strong
evidence in identifying vinyl chloride monomer as a human
carcinogen.
Despite these findings, courts may nonetheless be concerned
about inferences from animals to humans. However, such
concerns can be misplaced. Consider a hypothetical example
similar to one used by the Federal Judicial Center and the
Judicial Council of California to assist in educating judges about
scientific evidence:
Suppose a hypothetical plaintiff Mr. Jones was
exposed to XXBC in drinking water. As evidence for
the toxicity of XXBC, suppose in one study mice
exposed to 5 milligrams of substance XXBC per
kilogram of body weight have approximately six
times the rate of liver cancer as unexposed mice. The
Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 421 (Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000) and Environmental Protection Agency
Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, supra note 72, at
17977 (“[T]here is evidence that growth control mechanisms at the level of
the cell are homologous among mammals, but there is no evidence that these
mechanisms are site concordant [i.e., must be in the same tissue in rodents
and humans].”).
143
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SAFETY OF DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
SAFETY 157 (National Academies Press 2005) [hereinafter DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS].
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disease rate in the exposed mice was .20 (18 of 90
mice in this group had tumors) compared with the
control group (3 of 90 had tumors, a disease rate of
.03). Thus, the disease rate in mice attributable to
XXBC is 17/100 or 17 percent. The dose to which
the experimental mice were exposed was 170 times
that to which Mr. Jones was exposed. Suppose there
were similar results in rat studies. Suppose also that
the evidence from the two rodent studies suggests that
XXBC was a genotoxic carcinogen and that there was
a linear relationship between dose and response.144
In addition, although were no statistically significant human
studies exist, Mr. Jones and a few others who were sampled in
the area had DNA damage consistent with DNA damage seen in
animal studies, but these studies were not statistically
significant.145 Major alternative explanations of Mr. Jones’ liver
cancer (hepatitis B and exposure to aflatoxins) could be ruled
out with reasonable confidence.146
Consider only the exposure of mice compared with
exposures of humans. Many people may believe because rodents
receive higher doses of a substance than those to which humans
are exposed, that such studies are irrelevant to humans.
However, this may result from a misunderstanding of the
studies, a considerable public relations campaign against them,
and, in any case, is often a red herring. Given the above
information, scientists can calculate the likely disease rate for
humans who had lower environmental exposures to XXBC. It is
simply the disease rate in the animals divided by the much
higher dosage they received because the toxicant acts by means
of a linear mechanism. Thus, in the exposed animals the disease
rate was 17/100 or 17 percent. If there were a particular cancer
in 17 percent of the population, it would be among the very

144

University of California/Judicial Council Summit, CASE STUDY
VIGNETTE: Toxic Tort, Oct. 3, 2006.
145
Id.
146
Id.
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highest cancer rates!147 Discounting the disease rate in humans
by their lesser dose (170 times smaller) would yield a disease
rate in an exposed human population (at the lower dosage) of
1/1000. A cancer rate of 1/1000 in an exposed human
population would have to be compared with the rate in the
general unexposed human population to see whether the relative
risk was sufficiently high to merit legal compensation, and
scientists would have to determine whether the particular
individual had other possible exposures or conditions that would
have increased his liver disease rate.
However, to make things simple, if liver cancer rate in the
general population were 1/2000, those exposed to XXBC (at the
assumed level) would have double the risk of liver cancer
compared with the general population (or a relative risk of 2:1).
If the disease rate in the general population were lower, e.g.,
1/5000, the relative risk for those exposed to XXBC would be
even greater (5:1). This would be quite a high relative risk.
To conclude, animal studies are relevant evidence for
addressing the toxicity of a substance for general causation in
the law because scientists routinely rely upon them for the
reasons given above. Moreover, particular animal studies should
not be disqualified as evidence for causation simply because
animals are exposed to higher doses of a toxicant than humans.
In particular, one would not tolerate a disease rate in humans as
high as 17 percent of the exposed population as existed among
rodents in the hypothetical example above. Finally, animal
evidence can be quite powerful for general causation and
possibly for specific causation in the law, as the above example
shows, when appropriate extrapolations can be made. Of course,
not all animal studies will necessarily be as valuable as the
hypothetical, but animal evidence is often relevant and powerful,
especially for carcinogens and reproductive toxicants.
147

For comparison, a woman’s chances of contracting breast cancer
between birth and 70 years of age is 7.13% and her chances of contracting it
between birth and death is 13.22%. A man’s chances of contracting prostate
cancer between birth and 70 years of age is 14.51% and of contracting it
between birth and death is 17.93%. American Cancer Society, Surveillance
Research, http://www.cancer.org/downloads/stt/CAFF06Prob.pdf.
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2. Molecular Evidence
A second kind of toxicological evidence that can be quite
important, but that fares badly in courts, is evidence about the
molecular structure and its attendant biological activity in
mammalian systems. For example, the Allen court struggled
with the relevance of molecular studies, noting that they were
“the beginning, not the end of the scientific inquiry and proves
nothing about causation without other scientific evidence.”148
The court excluded the molecular data and subsequently the
expert as well.149
A standard toxicology textbook notes the importance of
molecular evidence: “An agent’s structure, solubility, stability,
pH sensitivity, electrophilicity, volatility and chemical reactivity
can be important information for hazard identification [that is,
for identifying hazards caused by substances].”150 “Historically,
certain key molecular structures have provided regulators with
some of the most readily available information on the basis of
which to assess hazard potential.”151 These include information
about some carcinogens, structural alerts for “aromatic amine
groups,” and certain dyes as potential carcinogens. Some
provide important information about developmental toxicants.152
The Institute of Medicine and National Research Council,
addressing the toxicity of dietary supplements, highlights the
underlying scientific rationale for the significance of structureactivity data for identifying adverse effects of toxicants:
The physical-chemical properties and biological
effects of a substance are derived from its chemical
148

Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996).
This court might have believed that the molecular evidence was
scientifically relevant, but inadequate in the absence of what it saw as other
needed evidence to support the causation claims (some of its arguments
suggest this point). Id at 197-98.
150
ELAINE M. FAUSTMAN & GILBERT S. OMENN, Risk Assessment, in
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 6th ed., 86 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed.,
McGraw-Hill 2001).
151
Id.
152
Id.
149
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structure. If the chemical structure of a dietary
supplement is known, but additional insight into the
biological activity is needed, then it is scientifically
appropriate to consider the information about the
biological activity of structurally related substances. It
is assumed that the biological effects of chemicals,
including toxic effects, are implicit in their molecular
structures (referred to as toxicophores when they are
associated with toxic effects). This concept is most
clearly illustrated with the example of ephedra, which
is considered by some scientists to have similar
physiological actions, although less potent, to the
chemically related substance amphetamine, as well as
the
recently
banned
pharmaceutical
agent
phenylpropanolamine.153
Scientists also recognize that certain classes of structureactivity relationships have been quite important in identifying
chemical groups that are known to interact with mammalian
DNA or proteins. Such relationships provide strong, but not
quite infallible, reasons for thinking that substances with
chemical similarities have similar biological activity.154
Courts can be quite dismissive of molecular or chemical
structure data.155 One possible reason is that similar chemical
structures are not mathematically certain guides to similar
toxicity effects, but mathematical certainty is not required in tort

153

DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 205-06, citing Food and
Drug Administration, 69 Fed. Reg. 6787, 6787-854 (2005); I. Furuya & S.
Watanabe, Discriminative Stimulus Properties of Ephedra Herb (Ephedra
Sinica) in Rats, 13 YAKUBUTSU SEISHIN KODO 33, 33-38 (1993); C. R. Lake
& R. S. Quirk, CNS stimulants and the Look-Alike Drugs, 7 PSYCHIATRY
CIN. NORTH AMERICAN 689, 689-701 (1984).
154
FAUSTMAN & OMENN, supra note 150, at 83-104; J. ASHBY & R.W.
TENNANT, Chemical Structure, Salmonella Mutagenicity and Extent of
Carcinogenicity as Indicators of Genotoxic Carcinogenesis Among 222
Chemicals Tested in Rodents By The U.S. NCI/NTP, 204 MUTATION
RESEARCH 17, 17-115 (1988).
155
As occurred in Allen v. Penn. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th
Cir. 1996).
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cases, given the tort law standard of proof. Chemical structurebiological activity data is ordinarily scientifically relevant
evidence that can assist toxicity judgments.156 Whether it is or
not will depend upon the particular evidence in question—it
should not be dismissed because it is a particular kind or
category of evidence. In addition, sometimes such evidence can
contribute substantial evidence of causation for some classes of
substances, as it could have in Allen v. Pennsylvania
Engineering.157 In any case, such data should be part of
scientifically reasonable patterns of evidence of causation, if it is
relevant. How much scientific weight, probative value, or
evidentiary strength molecular data has for a scientific argument
in individual cases will depend on the substance, its properties,
adverse effects, and other evidence that is available. Following
the Daubert mandate, if the courts are to make the law better
comport with the pertinent science in a case, they must
recognize the scientific relevance and sometimes quite strong
evidentiary weight of structure-activity relationships and other
molecular properties.
The structure-activity evidence for ethylene oxide (ETO) in
Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering was especially powerful
evidence of its particular toxicity. ETO is a multisite mutagen
(that is, it causes DNA mutations in many tissues), a quite
significant biological feature of a substance.158 Moreover,
because it is a small molecule that requires no metabolic

156

CRANOR, supra note 45, at 111-12; IARC, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Preamble to MONOGRAPH SERIES, Section 4 (a description is
provided of any structure-activity relationships that may be relevant to an
evaluation of the carcinogenicity of an agent, the toxicological implications of
the physical and chemical properties, and any other data relevant to the
evaluation that are not included elsewhere.).
157
See discussion and accompanying text infra notes 200-01.
158
“Mutagenicity testing, combined with an evaluation of chemical
structure, has been found to identify a large proportion of trans-species,
multiple-site carcinogens,” R. JULIAN PRESTON & GEORGE R. HOFFMANN,
Genetic Toxicology, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 342 (Curtis D.
Klassen et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001).
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transformation to produce toxic effects (it is “direct-acting”),159
it could reach nearly any target site in the body. The rat studies
utilized in Allen noted above showed it could cross the bloodbrain barrier and reach the brain.160 Contrary to the view of the
court, the ETO molecular evidence provided particularly
powerful evidence of ETO’s toxicity.161
3. Case Reports
Case studies or case reports typically “arise from a
suspicion, based on clinical experience, that the concurrence of
two events—that is, a particular exposure and occurrence of a
cancer—has happened rather more frequently than would be
expected by chance.”162 Case reports for vaccines and drugs are
part of what health professionals call “passive reporting schemes
that rely on the vigilance of health care providers to detect
events that are felt to be due to the administration of a drug
product.”163 They also are one of five major kinds of evidence
159

“Direct-acting carcinogens are typically carcinogenic at multiple sites
and in all species examined. A number of the direct-acting alkylating agents,
including some used in chemotherapy, are carcinogenic for humans.” (Vainio
et al., 1991). HENRY C. PITOT III AND YVONENE P. DRAGAN, Chemical
Carcinogenesis, in CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 681, 686 (Curtis
D. Klassen et al. eds., 6th ed. 2001).
160
This was plaintiffs’ experts’ argument, reported in CRANOR, supra
note 45, at 324-28.
161
This issue is described in greater detail in CRANOR, supra note 45, at
324-28. Moreover, as part of NSF Grant #99-10952, David Eastmond and I
had the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts reports in Allen v. Pennsylvania
Engineering reviewed by two extramural experts, who judged that plaintiffs’
arguments that ETO could cause brain cancer in humans (based largely on the
animal studies and information about the molecular properties of ETO) were
within a range where scientists could reasonably disagree (and in fact offered
the kinds of arguments that consensus scientific committees typically hear
about carcinogens).
162
IARC, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preamble to MONOGRAPH
SERIES, Section 8.
163
J. P. Collet et al., Monitoring Signals for Vaccine Safety: The
Assessment of Individual Adverse Event Reports by an Expert Advisory
Committee, 78 pt. 2 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG 178 (2000).
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utilized in occupational settings to identify toxicants.164
Case studies function best to reveal adverse causal reactions
to vaccines, drugs, poisons, some anesthetics, and even dietary
supplements.165 Their evidentiary value tends to increase when
there is a fairly short interval between exposure and reaction and
where adverse reactions are reasonably easily identified.166
However, they have also been used to identify adverse reactions
from occupational exposures (recall the discussion of vinyl
chloride above).167
Moreover, the Institute of Medicine Committee on the
adverse effects from vaccines concluded that
[I]n the absence of epidemiologic studies favoring
acceptance of a causal relation, individual case
reports and case series were relied upon, provided
that the nature and timing of the adverse event
following vaccine administration and the absence of
likely alternative etiologic candidates were such that a
reasonable certainty of causality could be
inferred . . . from one or more case reports. The
presence or absence of demonstrated biologic
plausibility was also considered in weighing the
overall balance of evidence for and against a causal
relation.168
To see how a case report can be especially good evidence,
consider the following. A 42-year-old man developed GuillainBarré Syndrome (GBS), an acute inflammatory demyelinating
polyneuritis following three independent tetanus shots over a 13year period. This disease “is characterized by the rapid onset of

164

Peter S. Thorne, Occupational Toxicology, in CASARETT AND
DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY 1131-32 (Curtis D. Klassen et al. eds., McGraw-Hill
Med. Pub. Division 6th ed. 2001).
165
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 131-32.
166
Id.
167
The presentation on case studies is developed more fully in CRANOR,
supra note 45, at Chapter 4.
168
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHILDHOOD VACCINES 31 (emphasis
added).
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flaccid motor weakness with depression of tendon reflexes and
elevation of protein levels in CSF without pleocytosis. The
annual incidence of GBS is about 1 per 100,000 for adults and
approximately the same for children.”169 The Institute of
Medicine judged that “because [this] case by Pollard and
Selby . . . demonstrates that tetanus toxoid did cause GBS, in
the [IOM] committee’s judgment tetanus toxoid can cause
GBS.”170 It then added, “[t]he relation between tetanus toxoid
and GBS is convincing at least for that one individual, even
though this man [subsequent to his last episode of GBS caused
by tetanus toxoid] experienced multiple recurrences of
demyelinating polyneuropathy, most following acute viral
illness . . . . [Two other cases] are recorded in enough detail to
be accepted as GBS.”171
The IOM regarded this single case report as sufficiently
powerful on its own to show the likelihood of causation resulting
from exposure to the tetanus toxoid (tetanus toxoid was capable
of causing GBS). Moreover, the IOM judged the likelihood of
general causation from the specific causation in this case.172
Finally, they had little other data regarding adverse effects of
tetanus toxid other than some background knowledge that
foreign proteins introduced by vaccines can cause various
adverse immune system reactions and the specific facts of the
case. In particular, they had no epidemiological studies and no
animal studies that reinforced this inference.173
The Article I Special Masters in the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP), who assess whether persons
have suffered compensable injuries from vaccines, “have
debated the utility of case reports” for causation inferences.174
169

Id. at 86.
Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
171
Id.
172
Id. (“[B]ecause [this] case by Pollard and Selby (1978) demonstrates
that tetanus toxoid did cause GBS, in the [IOM] committee’s judgment
tetanus toxoid can cause GBS.”) (emphasis in original).
173
Other case reports are discussed in CRANOR, supra note 45, at
Chapter 4.
174
Stevens v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V,
170
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Some had initially opposed them, but, in the end, even a judge
who was at first skeptical about them:
concluded that a single persuasive case report and a
petitioner whose symptoms matched the case report’s
facts adequately supported petitioner’s actual
causation claim for a tetanus toxoid cased GBS . . .
Later, . . . [the same special master] opined that a
single case report may support the possibility that a
vaccine can cause a certain injury, “[i]f sound
medical and scientific principles have been applied in
that one case and the matter has been published for
peer review.”175
The case report that the judge found persuasive is the tetanus
toxoid case study cited by the Institute of Medicine in the
preceding paragraph.176
Not all case reports will be such powerful evidence as the
one mentioned or as strong as the case reports that assisted in
the identification of the vinyl chloride monomer as a human
carcinogen.177 Some may be poor reports that should not be
considered scientifically relevant. However, courts should
recognize that many case reports can be scientifically relevant
and can serve as part of the evidentiary basis of a good scientific
argument.178 They would need to assess each one for scientific
relevance and not dismiss them because they are a kind of
evidence that does not unerringly point to toxicity.

2001 WL 387418, at *14 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001) (quoting O’Leary v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 90–1729V, 1997 WL
254217, at *3 (Apr. 4, 1997)).
175
Id.
176
Id. at *15 n. 31.
177
See supra notes at 12-13 and accompanying text for further
discussion
178
Some of the evidentiary value of case reports are discussed in more
detail in CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapters 4 and 6.
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C. Scientists Assess All the Relevant Scientific Evidence for
a Conclusion
Central to nondeductive (scientific) arguments is a need to
integrate all the relevant and available evidence to come to a
conclusion about the most likely explanation of what is
occurring. In assessing a substance’s toxicity, scientists typically
utilize human evidence, if it is available, experimental animal
studies, if they are available, any chemical structure-biological
activity evidence, and any mechanistic evidence in order to
evaluate what conclusion follows.179 A widely shared view in
setting out and assessing scientific arguments is, “never throw
[relevant] evidence away.”180
Recall from above that the International Agency for Research
on Cancer scientific committees explicitly go through a stepwise
process to integrate human and animal evidence together with
mechanistic and other evidence to assess whether a substance is
a carcinogen.181 Recommendations for integrating evidence are
not unusual; quite the contrary, they are routine.182 For a more
theoretical example of how all relevant evidence must be
considered, consider Susan Haack’s description of Watson’s and
Crick’s evidence for the double-helix structure of DNA:
Chargaff’s discovery that there are approximate
regularities in the relative proportions of adenine and
thymine, guanine[,] and cytosine in DNA is hardly,
by itself, strong evidence that DNA is a doublehelical, backbone-out macromolecule with like-withunlike base pairs; Franklin’s X-ray photographs of
the B form of DNA are hardly, by themselves, strong
179

This is shown by many examples from the International Agency for
Research on Cancer or similar examples from the national Toxicology
Program. See CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19.
180
Hutchinson & Lane, supra note 48, at 10.
181
See supra note 59 for a further discussion concerning IARC.
182
See, e.g., Cogliano, et. al, supra note 59 for a description of the
process at IARC. Examples from the National Toxicology Program indicate a
similar integration of evidence occurs in their deliberations.
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evidence that DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out
macro-molecule with like-with-unlike base pair. That
the tetranucleotide hypothesis is false is hardly, by
itself, strong evidence that DNA is a double-helical,
backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-unlike
base pairs, and so on. But put all these pieces of
evidence together, and the double-helical, backboneout, like-with-unlike base pairs, structure of DNA is
very well warranted (in fact, the only entry that
fits).183
This esoteric theoretical discovery, based on the integration
of several different kinds of evidence, is likely much more
difficult than inferring whether an exposure to a substance has
made a causal contribution to disease. Yet, it points to the
necessity for scientists, whether in the courtroom or laboratory,
to assimilate in a scientifically plausible way all the relevant
evidence to explain the claims in question. As noted above,
eliminating each piece of evidence one by one would undermine
this major scientific argument.184
Moreover, different patterns or kinds of evidence may play a
greater or lesser role in supporting a toxicity judgment,
depending upon what other evidence may be available in a
particular case.185 Sometimes one kind of evidence may be more
important, sometimes another. Animal, in vitro, and various
forms of mechanistic evidence, including structure-activity
relationships, can be particularly important, depending upon the
presence of other evidence.186 Other kinds of evidence have
become increasingly important for assessing the toxicity of
substances when there is poor or no human evidence. This has
led some distinguished cancer researchers to point out that
“there should be no [hierarchy of state-of-the-art approaches for
making toxicity decisions]. Epidemiology, animal, tissue culture
183

See Haack, supra note 126, at 237 (2001).
See supra discussion at notes 122-26.
185
For examples see CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19.
186
For some examples of this point see Cranor & Eastmond, supra note
124, at 36-41; CRANOR, supra note 45, at 302-19.
184
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and molecular pathology should be seen as integrating evidences
in the determination of human carcinogenicity.”187 The Institute
of Medicine and the National Research Council echo this
point.188
The mere fact that one piece of evidence does not strongly
support a conclusion does not imply that all the evidence taken
together fails to support it. In other words, a particular piece of
evidence might fall short of ideal evidence of its kind, or even
of ideal evidence for supporting the conclusion at issue, but the
total evidence may still support the conclusion as more likely
than not correct.189
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTS
How should courts approach scientific arguments, given the
framework discussed above? The nature of scientific arguments
(inferences to the best explanation) and their features suggest the
following procedure for reviewing expert testimony independent
187

Michele Carbone, George Klein, Jack Gruber & May Wong, Modern
Criteria to Establish Human Cancer Etiology, 64 CANCER RESEARCH 5518,
5522 (2004).
188
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 254 (“It is also not
appropriate to develop a hierarchical approach to considering the different
types of data—human data, animal data, in vitro data, or information about
related substances—for various reasons. In part, such an approach is not
feasible because of limitations in the quality of the data and what different
types of studies can reveal, but these limitations can be overcome with other
types of data. Although a hierarchical approach is not practical, it is possible
to weigh the various types of data available to make conclusions regarding
risk to human health.”).
189
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, supra note 143, at 255 (“Individual pieces
of information from any one of the categories of information (human, in
vitro, animal, or related substances data) may sometimes be sufficiently
compelling to both exceed a threshold of concern and to justify focused
evaluation or action. In many circumstances, however, data will need to be
collated within the same category or across several categories to determine
the appropriate level of concern. That is, even if concern raised by one
category of data—for example, human data—does not meet a threshold for
action, the body of evidence available across several categories may raise the
level of concern.”).
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of legal language with which courts will be more familiar.
Courts could inquire into the scientific relevance of
individual pieces of evidence, but only if the evidence appears
obviously irrelevant. Perhaps better, if courts are concerned
about the scientific relevance of individual pieces of evidence,
they might query how particular pieces could, however slightly,
affect a particular scientist’s conclusion. Such a relevance review
would not ordinarily result in rejection of evidence, since
relevance criteria are comparatively easy to satisfy. An
intellectual presumption might be that evidence is scientifically
relevant, unless a judge finds a scientist cannot explain the
relevance of particular evidence.
Moreover, given the paucity of understanding of the toxicity
of substances, courts need to recognize the obvious potential
relevance of molecular evidence, animal studies, and good case
reports. These are all kinds of studies with which some have
struggled when they assumed individual pieces of evidence had
to support by themselves, or perhaps provide major support for,
an expert’s conclusions.
Once courts are satisfied that no individual pieces of
evidence are irrelevant, or they have excluded any that are
obviously irrelevant, they could then review proposed testimony
to determine whether the testimony or the argument, based on
all the scientifically relevant and integrated evidence that the
expert had used, is minimally legally plausible for the claims in
question. They should ask: how plausible (or well supported) is
the argument, given all the integrated evidence utilized by the
expert? This is how one would think about nondeductive
arguments outside the context of the law. Finally, in reviewing
all the evidence considered together, courts might well find that
experts can legitimately disagree about the weight or strength
that each piece of evidence has for the overall argument. Courts
must recognize the fact of scientific disagreement and allow for
it in reviewing expert testimony.190
What do these recommendations mean in terms of legal
guidance with which courts would be familiar? According to the
190

CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapter 7 (esp. 289-96).
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Amended Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 the test for
reviewing expert testimony is whether:
(1) the testimony [which I take to be scientific
argument] is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony [scientific argument] is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.191
The logic of Rule 702 can be read as compatible with the
ways in which scientists would assess other scientists’
arguments. Consider only the first two clauses. A plausible
reading of clause (1) appears to suggest that courts address the
following question: considering all the scientifically relevant
evidence a scientist has taken into account, is his or her
testimony (which can be the expert’s nondeductive argument for
general or specific causation) supported by sufficient evidence
for the conclusion he or she draws in order for a jury to
consider it? That is, this section in order to make it compatible
with assessing nondeductive arguments could be read to suggest
that courts should review whether an expert’s scientifically
relevant evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently strong for the
conclusion for which an expert argues and sufficiently strong to
pass a reliability review to assist a jury. There is no suggestion
that individual items of evidence be rejected piecemeal as
insufficiently supportive of the overall scientific conclusion.
Perhaps this could be one interpretation of the clause, but it
would be incompatible with scientific approaches to argument
evaluation.
Clause (2) requires that an expert’s testimony must be based
upon “reliable principles and methods.”192 An inference to the
best explanation is a standard inferential methodology that
scientists and many other experts utilize to infer causation and
other empirical claims. The methodology is widely endorsed and

191

Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, “Proposed Amendment:
Rule 702” (December 2000) (emphasis in original).
192
Id.
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accepted.193 Particular scientific arguments, or uses of the
method, are as “good” or “reliable” as an expert constructs
them. How strong is the relation between all the relevant
evidence in the premises and the conclusion drawn? In the terms
of this article, the question would be, “Is the inference based on
all the relevant evidence sufficiently plausible to assist a jury?”
This suggests the following question for the courts: “Is a
litigant’s expert’s argument, taking into account all the
scientifically relevant evidence, sufficiently minimally plausible
(reliable) for the expert to be admitted to testify?” Alternatively
is the relationship between the premises and the conclusion so
speculative, given all the scientifically relevant evidence that the
expert should not be permitted to testify?
Courts are likely to see mixed patterns of evidence with
some possibly good case reports, likely some quite good animal
data, molecular data, but at least sometimes with no definitive
epidemiological studies. Because of scientific ignorance about
the universe of chemical substances, poor testing of products by
firms194 and perhaps reduced incentives for others to test them,
toxicity data is likely to be limited,195 forcing experts to utilize
arguments based upon a wide variety of scientifically relevant
evidence. Thus, judges will need to recognize that scientists
often must draw on more complex evidentiary patterns out of
necessity, recognize that they can be quite good, and be
prepared to admit testimony based on them even when there is
poor or no epidemiological evidence.
The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael provided
two valuable heuristics for reviewing scientific testimony for
admissibility.196 The first is that the court should ensure “that an
193

See supra Section II.
See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117,
2135 (1997) (citing studies of Agent Orange, asbestos, Bendectin, breast
implants, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, tobacco, MER/29 (a cholesterolreducing drug that caused cataracts), alachlor, atrazine, formaldehyde, and
perchloroethylene); CRANOR, supra note 45, at 166-70, 350-53, 364.
195
See discussion and accompanying text supra notes 1-3.
196
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
194
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expert . . ., employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field.”197 This heuristic appears to be amplified on
the following page where it is applied to the facts of the case. It
added that a court may exclude evidence if it finds that an
expert’s testimony falls “outside the range where experts might
reasonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the
conflicting views of different experts, even though the evidence
is ‘shaky.’”198 Both heuristics are something of sociological
guidelines for judges: How does this expert’s testimony on the
issue in question compare to the standards of the profession (the
first) or to other experts in the field (the second).
The second heuristic is especially attractive and some judges
have found it quite practical. Judge Lee utilized it in a Parlodel
case,199 and Judge Pointer used it in the Silicone Breast Implant
Litigation.200 Given the nature of scientific arguments, this can
be quite a helpful guide, as I have argued elsewhere.201
It follows from the second heuristic that if an expert’s
197

Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 153.
199
Order of the Court, April 6, 2001, in Soldo v. Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003). Judge Lee
requested that if the appointed experts, disagreed with plaintiffs’ experts that
Parlodel can and did cause stroke, address whether “opinions [should] be
considered subject to sufficient genuine dispute as would permit other
persons, generally qualified in your field of expertise, to express opinions
that, though contrary to yours, would likely be viewed by others in the field
as presenting legitimate and responsible disagreement within your
professions?” Court’s Instructions to Experts appointed Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 706.
200
Judge Pointer utilized this heuristic to guide the deliberations of a
Rule 706 National Academy of Sciences Panel, which was instructed to
“review and critique the scientific literature pertaining to the possibility of a
causal association between silicone breast implants and connective tissue
diseases, related signs and symptoms, and immune system dysfunction.”
Judge Pointer was the coordinating judge for the federal breast implant multidistrict litigation. The Panel published a report, dated November 17, 1998,
which is entitled Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue
Diseases and Immunologic Dysfunction.
201
CRANOR, supra note 45, at Chapter 7.
198
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testimony is within the range of opinion where experts might
reasonably differ on a scientific issue before a court even though
the evidence is shaky, then he or she should be admitted to
testify. Testimony that is within such a zone of reasonable
scientific disagreement seems precisely the kind of testimony
courts should permit juries to hear on disputed issues.202
In toxic tort cases, there are usually at least two, and
possibly more conclusions that litigants may claim are supported
by the totality of the evidence. Plaintiffs typically claim that
exposure to defendants’ substance caused or contributed to
plaintiffs’ injuries, whereas defendants will claim that something
else, such as other exposures, bad luck, genetic predisposition,
unknown antecedents, etc., caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, one
large factual issue for a jury is the comparison of two or more
explanations: Is the plaintiff’s explanation more probable than
the defendant’s? A judge’s task would seem to be to determine
whether each side’s scientific testimony is sufficiently plausible,
or “within the range of opinion where experts might reasonable
differ,” given the relevant evidence on the issue, for a jury to
hear the testimony.203 The jury must then assess the weight and
credibility of the scientific evidence together with other evidence
to decide the case.204
CONCLUSION
A central virtue of the law is fairness between litigants at the
bar. It should be especially committed to fairness in
admissibility decisions because such decisions can be so critical
and outcome determinative. With the change in principles
guiding admissibility from Frye to Daubert courts can no longer
rely on generic admissibility reviews that were more typical
under Frye. Instead, they will need to review individual

202

Of course such testimony should reliably apply to the facts of the
case, as Daubert and the Amended Rule 702 require.
203
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
204
A more extensive discussion of these issues is in CRANOR, supra note
45, at Chapter 7.
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scientific arguments by experts and some of the individual
evidence on which they rest for relevance. This is a difficult
task, much more burdensome than under Frye, and something
that challenges those distant from the science. If expert
testimony is within the range of opinion where experts might
reasonably differ on a scientific issue, the expert should be
admitted to testify before a jury. If not, the expert should be
excluded. Admitting testimony that is with a zone where
comparable experts might reasonably differ would be part of fair
admissibility reviews.
The upshot of this proposal is that any assessments of
plausibility or reliability (or whether the expert’s argument has
the same intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of other
experts in the relevant field or is within a zone of reasonable
disagreement) should be applied to overall scientific arguments,
not typically to individual pieces of evidence. This is not likely
to make courts’ tasks easier; quite the contrary, such judgments
will be more complicated than assessments some courts have
made about individual pieces of evidence (but such reviews
frequently were mistaken ways to evaluate scientific arguments,
unless they focused merely on issues of relevance). Moreover,
given how little is often known about potential toxicants, courts
may face complex patterns of evidence that increase their
challenges. Even though this is a much more daunting procedure
to implement, it is the way scientists would review analogous
arguments in their field. Fairness to an expert’s testimony would
seem to require that courts review it as scientists would. If
courts are going to review particular scientific arguments
(testimony) as Daubert mandated, they will need to face up to
the challenges of the task or perhaps return to a less intrusive,
more generic guide for reviewing expert testimony.205

205

For an alternative to Daubert for reviewing expert testimony, see
Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service, 199 Ill.2d 63 (2002). Other
state courts have not followed the Daubert approach. See supra note 98. See
also Raphael Metzger, The Demise Of Daubert In State Courts, Commentary
for Lexis Nexis MEALEY’S Emerging Toxic Torts 14 (5) (June 3, 2005);
available at http://www.mealeys.com.

